Showing posts with label Zack Greinke. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Zack Greinke. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Kauffman Stadium and Fly Ball Pitchers

I set out to write a post regarding how fly ball pitchers fair better in Kauffman Stadium than other parks. Basically, I took the top six pitchers in games started from each of Dayton Moore's six seasons at the helm. In a database I then compiled the innings pitched, ERA, ground ball percentage (league average 44%), and HR/FB (league average is 9.5%) of each of the starter's seasons. Following this, I weighted each starter's inputs into a team total based off of innings pitched.

Eventually, I ran a correlation analysis, as well as created a few line graphs that I overlaid over one another in order to get a quick visual. I did this in an attempt to determine how similar the line graphs were in structure. Not surprisingly, I did not find any serious connections between the elements. Of course, the sample size was incredibly small given that I was looking at team totals over six seasons.

I then decided that instead of focusing on the team totals, I would look at all of the starters individually. For this step, I simply created a scatter plot for both ERA versus GB% and ERA versus HR/FB. Here is a look at those scatter plots.


Obviously, there is nothing groundbreaking in this 15 minutes of research. The linear line above isn't anything to crazy. If we were to actually analyze how Kauffman favors fly ball pitchers compared to other parks, we would of course have to compare the above scatter plot to that of Major League averages. One thing that I will note, is that in general we are told that pitchers are better if they can induce ground balls. However, based off of the incredibly small sample above, our linear equation is actually very level across the board. In fact, if you examine the line closely, you will notice a slight slope indicated that fly ball pitchers fair slightly better at the K. 

If we were to really look closely at these types of numbers, of course we would want to include strikeout and walk rates in our study. But if I had to make a conclusion on this quick study, the fact that the line tilts ever so slightly in favor of fly ball pitchers would lead me to believe that this type of pitcher should find Kauffman Stadium's confines friendly. 


Examining our second graph, we once again don't find anything ground breaking. It doesn't take a genius to tell you that more home runs would lead to a higher ERA. I still have to wonder how this slope would compare to the slopes of other Major League parks, but given the dimensions of the K's outfield one would guess that HR/FB are lower for Royals starters. While I would expect the data points to be lower on the Y axis, I would also expect the slope to be less steep for other team's starters. 

I would theorize that due to the higher number of hits at Kauffman Stadium, home runs would hurt more than they would at a park where there are typically less base runners. For that reason, it is ideal for Royals pitchers to have a strong combination of a high fly ball percentage, with a low home run to fly ball percentage. This recipe for success is in no way unique to Kauffman Stadium, but given the park factors of Kauffman Stadium it is likely much more pronounced than the average Major League Park. 

An excellent example of this came in 2009. Zack Greinke was excellent in many facets of his game during that season, but one aspect that was particularly incredible was his ability to limit home runs despite inducing ground balls just 40.2% of the time. Like I said, this was just one part of Greinke's success. However, given Kauffman Stadiums park effects and the manner in which Greinke was recording outs, it isn't any wonder how the Cy Young winner was able to outperform his xFIP by nearly a full run. 

Over the last six seasons, eight Royals "starters" (ERAs include their time in the bullpen), have posted ERAs under 4.00. Six of those eight starters registered below the league average of 4t% ground balls. None of those eight starters posted a HR/FB above league average (9.5%). 

Eleven out of the 36 starters studied, recorded ground ball percentages below 44% as well as limited HR/FB to under 9.5% (I am including 2008 Greinke who just missed the cut with a 42.7 GB%). Here is how those starters rank in ERA among those unqualifying starters. I have put their names in bold
  1. 2009 Greinke 2.16
  2. 2012 Guthrie 3.16
  3. 2008 Greinke 3.47
  4. 2007 Meche 3.67
  5. 2007 Greinke 3.69
  6. 2011 Chen 3.77
  7. 2007 Bannister 3.87
  8. 2008 Meche 3.98
  9. 2008 Davies 4.06
  10. 2011 Paulino 4.11
  11. 2010 Chen 4.17
The two unranked seasons that met the criteria were 2010 Davies (5.34) and 2011 Davies (6.75). Outside of a couple of Davies anomalies (leave it to Kyle Davies to screw something up), it seems pretty certain that the recipe for success at Kauffman Stadium is to keep the balls in the park, while inducing a large number of air outs. (Again this is a good recipe for success anywhere, I just suspect that it is more pronounced for Royals starters. More work would undoubtedly need to be done in order to confirm or refute this belief.)

What does this mean moving forward?

Whether the Royals intended to or not, they acquired several fly ball pitchers this offseason. Ervin Santana's career ground ball percentage is 38.9%, Jeremy Guthrie's is 40.6% and Wade Davis's is 37.9%. (James Shields's is 45.1%.) Davis is the only one of the first three that fall below 10% HR/FB threshold. However, Santana's career mark is 10.8% and Guthrie's is 10.6%. It doesn't feel too crazy to ask they cut just 1% off of their career marks.

I've long felt as though fly ball pitchers can really thrive in Kauffman Stadium. I've wondered many times whether Kauffman's postive affects on fly ball pitchers have been undervalued. Let's hope that this proves to be true. Let's hope that the rotation can keep the ball in the yard and the outfielders busy. If I'm right, we could be pleasantly surprised by the rotation's results in 2013. 

Sunday, October 9, 2011

One Season Post Greinke

Yesterday morning I received the following text from a friend and fellow Royals' diehard:

"Now that the Brewers are in the NLCS and Zack Greinke and Yuniesky Betancourt are doing well, would you reassess the trade? Jeremy Jeffress and Lorenzo Cain hardly saw time and Alcides Escobar is really all we had to show for it."


I told my friend that instead of attempting to answer this question in a text, I would reply to him in the form of a blog post, so here we go.

Before saying anything else, at the time of the trade I commented that there is no way Yuniesky Betancourt should be the starting shortstop for a team expecting to win rings. Now though, the Brewers are doing everything they can to prove me wrong. Betanourt, despite posting a .252/.271/.381 line, has retained the starting shortstop job throughout the season.

In the playoffs Betancourt has upped that line to .278/.316/.444 and has came up with a couple of timely hits. With that being said I don't believe that Betancourt's line in any way could make this trade look worse from a Royals perspective. The fact that the Brewers are in the NLCS seems to have come in spite of Yuniesky Betancourt not as a result of his performance.

Zack Greinke on the other has been huge in the Brewers' magical run this season. His era is 3.83 and he has a 16-6 record. But looking even closer he has posted the highest K rate of his career at 10.54, with a walk rate of just 2.36. His xFIP is 2.56 and it wouldn't be hard to make the argument that this is the best season of his career outside of 2009.

Really though Greinke is doing exactly what we expected him to do this season, dominate. Well until the postseason, where he has had trouble staying low in the zone and has become a bit home run prone.

So what about for the Royals? As my friend stated Jeffress and Cain hardly saw time. This is true. Jeffress's stock definitely took a hit as he proved ineffective in the Major League pen and after transitioning to the rotation in Northwest Arkansas saw his control totally fall apart.

Jeffress's stuff is still there and I expect him to refine his command enough to be a useful piece in a Big League pen. However, his season was definitely a big disappointment.

Cain on the other hand did nothing to cause his stock to drop. He didn't receive hardly any big league time, because of the unexpectedly outstanding play of Melky Cabrera, not because he under performed.

In fact, with another season in the books I'm much more excited about Lorenzo Cain then I was at the time of the trade. Reports are his defense was absolutely spectacular in Omaha, all while hitting .312/.380/.497 with 16 home runs and 16 steals.

The outfield's performance in 2011 was obviously a huge plus for the Royals. They now have four viable solutions entering 2012. Should they trade Cabrera, Cain can step in and if they don't they can have depth while also controlling inventory and pushing Cain's arbitration and free agency back another season.

My friend is correct in stating that Alcides Escobar was all we had to show for the trade in 2011. Escobar was excellent defensively and thanks to an incredibly hot streak in the middle of the season, was passable on the offensive side of things. Moving forward Escobar has provided the Royals with at least a temporary solution at short stop and if the offense can continue to progress he could be a cornerstone.

Of course there is one more piece to this trade that has been totally forgotten here. This isn't the first time that I have discussed this trade with a friend and they have forgotten about the Royals' fourth piece: Jake Odorizzi.

Out of all the players involved in the trade, Odorizzi raised his stock more than anyone in 2011. If he can fix his problem with elevating his pitches in the zone he will be a front of the rotation guy in short order. Odorizzi is on the short list of prospects that can be argued for the top spot in the system.

At the time of the trade I believed that it could truly work out great for both parties. It was obvious the Royals HAD to move Greinke. Shelving a pitch in mid-August, threatening to no show for Spring Training, and who knows what else behind close doors. He had to be moved.

The trade was made by the Brewers to better contend in 2011 and 2012. The Trade was made by the Royals to better contend in 2013 and on. Obviously the Brewers should look like they have won the deal after 2011. But nothing that happened in 2011 would suggest that the deal is any worse for the Royals moving forward.

Major League Baseball trades are designed to be wins for both parties. It isn't fantasy football when one guy/girl is most likely getting ripped off when the deal occurs. Just because the trade has worked out awesomely for the Brewers, doesn't mean that it can't wind up being a win for Kansas City as well. It is simply way to early to tell. For now though, the trade looks just as good from Kansas City's perspective as it did when it was completed.